Austrian Defence Monitor · Comprehensive national defence

How well can Austria defend itself? 15 of 23 indicators are below the minimum target.

The monitor compares the current state of Austria's national defence with a minimum and an optimum target – military, civil, economic and societal. It relies exclusively on publicly available sources.

Aerial view of Vienna: the statue of Helios atop the dome of the Natural History Museum, with the Volksgarten, Burgtheater and the city centre behind it in the morning light

The findings

How well prepared would Austria be for a serious crisis – militarily, civilly, economically and as a society? The Austrian Defence Monitor measures Austria's comprehensive national defence against 23 indicators, comparing the publicly documented current status of each with a minimum and an optimum target. The result is sobering: 16 of the 23 indicators fall below the minimum, only three reach the optimum, and for one more there is no public data.

The gap is widest in military defence. All ten indicators with a documented figure miss the minimum target. Austria has no medium- or long-range ground-based air defence and no armed drones, and it has 15 fighter aircraft instead of at least 36. The mobilisation organisation comprises around 55,000 soldiers; how many of them would be ready within 48 hours is not publicly reported. The target is at least 75,000. The defence budget stands at 1.2% of GDP.

Protection of the population also has gaps: shelter places exist for around five per cent of the people in the country, against a minimum target of 70%. Only half of the population keeps a food supply for emergencies. How many hospital beds could keep operating for 72 hours if infrastructure failed is not publicly known. One strength is the around 320,000 active civil protection personnel, carried above all by the volunteer fire brigades.

Economic defence proves comparatively robust. The strategic gas reserve covers 90 days and thus reaches the optimum, while fuel stocks and the diversification of critical imports meet the minimum target. Weak points remain reliably available domestic power generation and dependence on semiconductors from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The societal foundation is divided. 89% consider democracy the best form of government and 70% view the Armed Forces positively. Yet only 35% are satisfied with the political system, and only 32% would be willing to defend Austria by arms.

The situation overview

Where Austria stands on each indicator – at a glance. Click an indicator to go straight to its figures, targets and sources.

Methodology

The Monitor is an attempt to draw as broad a picture as possible of Austria's capacity to defend itself, grounded in the idea of resilience. In doing so, we face a fundamental trade-off: defence capability is complex and comprises a wide range of military, governmental, economic and societal factors. At the same time, the Monitor is meant to remain understandable, transparent and manageable. It therefore cannot provide a complete picture of reality.

We see the Monitor above all as a starting point for an objective discussion about what Austria needs for comprehensive defence capability – and which steps still have to be taken. In this, it builds on the Austrian Defence Lab's declaration of 26 October 2026. Comments, criticism and suggestions for developing the Monitor further are expressly welcome.

What the Monitor does not cover

The Monitor uses only publicly available information. This deliberately limits what it can say. Some factors that are central to defence capability cannot be meaningfully assessed because no sufficiently reliable public data exist. Other areas are deliberately not shown, or only in little detail, where publication could allow conclusions about specific weaknesses or capabilities of Austria.

One example is maintaining the state's ability to govern in a severe crisis (‘continuity of government’), which is internationally regarded as one of the basic prerequisites of state resilience. The same applies to parts of Austria's intelligence and cyber capabilities and to certain aspects of military mobility and logistics. In precisely these areas, a detailed public account of existing capacities, vulnerabilities or bottlenecks can itself be problematic in security terms.

For this reason, the Monitor also contains more input than output indicators. A state's available resources and capacities – such as personnel, systems or reserves – can usually be captured more easily in public than the question of what concrete military or governmental performance they actually produce in a crisis or in the event of defence. Yet it is precisely this readiness and sustainability that would be particularly relevant for a complete assessment.

A deliberate selection

Moreover, not every area that is relevant in principle needs an indicator of its own. The Monitor concentrates in particular on fields where there are deficits, a need for development or a relevant political debate. Capabilities that, by current assessment, work soundly and whose performance is the subject of broad expert consensus are in some cases not shown separately. Current examples are public warning systems and essential parts of the drinking water supply.

Even within the areas included, the Monitor does not claim to depict every capability at the level of detail that would be technically possible. Where a more detailed analysis would be interesting from an expert point of view but of limited necessity for the overall picture, or problematic for security reasons, we deliberately use broader indicators.

Scenarios and targets

Ideally, a complete assessment of Austria's defence capability would start from concrete threat and deployment scenarios and derive from them which capabilities and capacities Austria needs under different conditions. Important groundwork for this already exists: for example, the scenarios and planning assumptions surrounding ‘Unser Heer 2030’ and numerous public debates and analyses since the start of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

Such scenario-based capability planning is complex, however. Depending on the assumptions about the threat, warning time, duration of a conflict, international support or Austria's specific role, very different requirements arise. Developing these scenarios robustly within the Monitor and deriving quantitative targets for all indicators from them would go well beyond the project's current scope and ambition.

We have therefore initially opted for a more pragmatic approach. Depending on the indicator, the minimum and optimum values are based on the Armed Forces' development plan (Aufbauplan), existing Austrian objectives, comparison with structurally similar states and countries regarded as international pioneers in individual areas. The derivation is disclosed for each indicator.

In a future version of the Monitor, we would like to add scenario-based requirements to this methodology. This would allow us to answer more precisely not only which capabilities Austria needs in the abstract, but what would actually suffice under concrete crisis and conflict conditions.

Transparency of the assessment

For each indicator, we disclose what is measured, which data are used and how the respective minimum and optimum values are arrived at. The targets set are therefore not unquestionable requirements but reasoned reference values. They too are meant to be part of the discussion and can be developed further as new findings and better data become available.

Key

Current status

The current value as documented in publicly available sources. Anything not publicly documented is shown as a data gap and not estimated.

Minimum

The value below which the capability is no longer sufficient. Each indicator states where this value comes from – for example the Aufbauplan, an EU requirement or a benchmark set by the ADL.

Optimum

An ambitious but achievable target, usually based on European best practice. Every assumption is explained in the respective indicator.

Where the targets come from

Better data or relevant information? Write to us

Draft · Data as of October 2026. The monitor is a starting point for debate and will be expanded continuously – with further indicators, time series and a European comparison.

For the media

Media outlets and journalists are welcome to use and embed the data, findings and graphics of the Austrian Defence Monitor in their reporting, provided that the Austrian Defence Lab is credited as the source and, where possible, linked at austriandefencelab.org/en/monitor.

All graphics as download (ZIP)